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19 October 1967

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DRAFT ONE Contribution to "scrub-down" of the Panel Report

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1. Of the several types of observations in the draft report, only one -- concerning the Tallinn system -- is, strictly speaking, an intelligence problem. With regard to this problem, we believe the panel has erroneously ascribed to the Tallinn system dual SAM-ABM capabilities. That the panel should come to a different conclusion than the National Intelligence Estimates is, we think, partly a result of their own background and previous views, and partly a result of the fact that they were briefed on the system partly by members of organizations which shared their views.
2. Other Panel conclusions, dealing with the relative strategic relation of the US and the USSR, were apparently based largely upon assumptions with regard to methods of comparison and US capabilities, which are not subjects of intelligence; we do, however, believe the Panel is unduly pessimistic in their views. Still other conclusions, concerning the requirements for US intelligence to conduct broader assessments, largely reflect either limited contact the Panel has with the intelligence community and its products or a simple misconception about what Intelligence is (i.e., they want net evaluations which is not, and should not be, our business; such evaluation should be done, but not by Intelligence on its own.)
3. One general recommendation of the Panel in which we see some merit is that intelligence should think more of Soviet strategic capabilities as part of a single coordinated Soviet plan; that intelligence should engage more in advancing hypotheses concerning overall plans, as a way to test available evidence and as a vehicle for suggesting the most critical unavailable evidence. That the Panel was unhappy with our efforts in these directions was, we believe, partly a consequence of the fact that the briefing agenda was largely "hardware" oriented. (e.g., they were not briefed on 11-4).
4. Specific comments on each of the Panel conclusions is presented at annex.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Bruce Clarke

Attached is a copy of ONE's comments on
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the [] Panel Report. [] last
report is that the Panel has not been able to
agree on a text. When is still uncertain.)

I intend to have a meeting on where we
go some time next week .

[]
Ed Proctor

19 Oct 67
(DATE)

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